The end of North Korean conundrum not in sight

This was first posted in China U.S. Focus in English and also in translated Chinese.

North Korea celebrated the New Year with a bang. How big a bang has become a matter of dispute. Pyongyang insisted that they have detonated their first hydrogen bomb, just two days before celebrating young dear leader Kim Jong-un’s birthday. Other observers weren’t so sure that the seismic disturbance monitored from the explosion was big enough to pass as a nuclear fusion and not just another nuclear blast from fission.

The technical authenticity of the nuclear explosion was not really the issue. The consequent reaction from the international community was, to quote the well-known baseball philosopher, the late Yogi Berra, “it’s like deja vu all over again.” The UN Security Council met to impose more sanctions on North Korea. Washington, Tokyo and Seoul made a show of solidarity by voicing the same vigorous objection to the latest nuclear test by Pyongyang.

So how did North Korea react in the face of heavy censure and condemnation? Other than expressing displeasure at the PA, which was assaulting their eardrums with K-Pop from the other side of the DMZ, nothing much. North Korea had set off three previous atomic explosions and had by now gotten used to the international condemnation and sanctions.

Aside from turning the PA system back on, the only other outside response that could be considered “new” was for the USAF to fly a B-52 over the Korean peninsula, as if that sort of intimidation would bring the North Korean regime to their senses.

Even the final act of exasperation by Secretary of State Kerry was no different from past practices by his predecessors. He called China’s Foreign Affairs ministry to tell them that China’s approach on North Korea was not working and that North Korea’s behavior was a problem that Beijing needs to fix. Historically, whenever Washington gets frustrated with Pyongyang, North Korea becomes China’s problem to fix.

Invariably, every provocation by North Korea begot reaction by the Americans and allies leading to standoff and stalemate. Nothing changed yet tension has heightened. Is there a real way out?

According to his just released book, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry recounted how the U.S. and North Korea nearly concluded a deal in 2000. He led the effort as the Defense Secretary and continued in that role even after he left the Clinton administration. Unfortunately, the Clinton term of office expired before a treaty could be concluded.

Then George W. Bush entered the White House and he refused to continue the dialogue with North Korea. No doubt under the influence of the axis of neoconservatives, namely Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz, no self respecting president of a hegemon needed to talk to a member of the Axis of Evil—my conclusion, not Perry’s. For two years there were no meetings and no conversation between the two countries.

Even when the Bush administration resumed contact with the Pyongyang regime, the Bush team insisted that North Korea commit to halting any uranium enrichment as a pre-condition to any negotiation. The result was that both sides withdrew from the “Agreed Framework” hammered in place in late 1994 that had kept Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon development on hold.

According to Perry’s book, under the Agreed Framework, “North Korea agreed to stop all construction activity on two larger reactors and suspend their reprocessing to produce plutonium from the smaller, already operational reactor. South Korea and Japan agreed to build for North Korea two light water reactors (LWRs) for producing electricity; and until the LWRs were operational, the United States agreed to supply fuel oil to compensate North Korea for the electricity it would forfeit by shutting down its reactor.” 

Perry went on to say, “I considered this a good deal for the US: war was averted, plutonium production suspended, and North Korea gave up (permanently, it appears) their program for building the larger reactors that were under construction.” 

The consequence of tearing up the agreement was that North Korea resumed the production of weapon grade plutonium culminating in the first nuclear bomb test on October 9, 2006. As Perry ruefully observed to a group of admirers at a recent dinner party in Silicon Valley, getting North Korea to give up their possession of the bomb now was going to be much more challenging compared to an earlier time when it was possible to strike a deal before they had developed a bomb. Thus an opportunity for a nuclear free Korean peninsula was tragically lost.

In trying to remediate the increasingly poisoned relation between the U.S. and North Korea, China organized the six party talks in 2003 by inviting Japan, Russia and South Korea to the mix. But the mutual distrust between Pyongyang and Washington ran deep and the talks got nowhere. The only tangible outcome from the exercise was that the Americans could now hand North Korea over to China as their problem.

When President Obama entered the White House, his administration continued the Bush practice in their approach to North Korea, i.e., preferring confrontation to negotiation and blaming China to assuage their own frustration from lack of progress with North Korea.

Based on the history Perry recounted, it should be increasingly apparent to Obama that only a security treaty with the U.S. will mollify Pyongyang and convince them to behave more in accordance with acceptable global norms. Pyongyang sees that the U.S. can strike a deal with the other surviving member of the axis of evil, namely Iran. Why then won’t the U.S. negotiate a deal with North Korea? Setting off the most recent nuclear test could be Pyongyang’s way to get Washington’s attention.

With his remaining days in office, Obama needs to decide whether it’s more important to maintain the hegemonic pride and arrogant disdain or to revert to the basis began in the Clinton administration and pave a way forward to find a breakthrough with Pyongyang. If he decides on the latter, it will be a long process and no doubt become a legacy for his successor to finish the job—or not.

For Obama to have any chance of success, he would need help from China’s Xi Jinping. As I suggested previously, only a collaboration including China and South Korea could persuade Pyongyang to come to the negotiating table. On the other hand, the alignment of the U.S. and South Korea with Japan—good for raising the decibels of disapproval—would have no influence and leverage that would convince North Korea to cooperate.

- See more at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/no-end-to-north-korean-conundrum-in-sight/#sthash.yJO9htbS.dpuf

Celebrating the closure of the comfort women issue is premature

This blog was first posted in Asia Times.

Japan’s Prime Minister Abe got a belated Christmas present from South Korea—some might say the exceptional deal of seven decades since the end of WWII—when the Korean government agreed to formally end any further reference to the sexual slavery Japan enforced on the Korean women during WWII.  Thus, the book on the suffering of the Korean people in the hands of Japan’s imperial troops during the War and 30 years of brutal occupation before the War can be closed and the two countries can look ahead.

South Korea’s president Park accepted a verbal apology from Abe by telephone with the specific proviso that there would be no formal documentation of the apology in print that would benefit the posterity. The apology was accompanied by one billion yen compensation taken from Japan’s government budget, which because it did not come from private donations, was to pass as an official and formal apology. The disposition of the one billion yen was vague and not specifically designated as compensation to the surviving victims of Japan’s sexual slavery.

Japan did require that the statue commemorating the suffering of Korean comfort women be removed from its present location in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. So, I suppose part of the billion yen could be used to relocate the statue so that Japan need not face daily reminders of their shameful past.

Some quarters in Japan praised Abe for his courage in “breaking” with the past. Other supporters belonging to the right wing of the LDP were incensed that Abe made any sort of concession at all and suggested that only seppuku can expiate Abe’s disgrace.

Promptly the day after the agreement with South Korea was announced, Abe’s wife went to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine to pay her respects to the tablets memorializing the war criminals. She even posted selfies of her visit to make sure her appeasement to the right on behalf of her husband did not go unnoticed.

So much for the supposed sincerity of Japan’s apology.

According to various polls, the people of South Korea like Abe even less than they like the North Korea leader, Kim Jong-un. The puzzle then is why President Park so quickly came to terms with Abe. As recently as last November she was not willing to meet Abe much less discuss the conditions that would lead to the agreement. The only logical answer is that she felt heavy pressure from Washington.

Getting South Korea to forgive and forget about the sexual slavery issue might be a diplomatic win for Abe but is an even more important development for Obama. According to his worldview, Obama needed a solid alliance in northeast Asia as part of his pivot to Asia.  However, whether the tie between South Korea and Japan can withstand facing China remains to be seen.

Not that China is likely to challenge the link up based on military force. But as Asia Times reported on “China hits India where it hurts,” China builds its international ties with economic inducements. The piece was referring to China’s development with Nepal, “…so as to achieve mutual benefits, win-win results and common development, and elevate the long-lasting and friendly China-Nepal comprehensive cooperative partnership to new levels”.

China’s approach with Nepal is typical of China’s diplomacy with any country—namely, butter in the form of mutually beneficial economic advantages rather than guns. This approach as applied to South Korea has meant bilateral relations of ever-closer economic ties and increasing frequency of cultural and people exchanges.

Two years before South Korea concluded the Free Trade Agreement with China (in 2015), the bilateral trade with China already exceeded the total trade South Korea had with the U.S. and Japan, their No. 2 and 3 partners in trade. With the large volume of trade, it made sense for the two countries to enter into currency swap agreements so that the trade transactions can be settled in their respective local currency and by-pass the need to pay in dollars. In Korea today, the renminbi has become the only currency other than the dollar that is freely convertible into the won.

About 40% of all the foreign students studying in China come from South Korea, more than from any other country. Second only to the “American Dream,” the “China Dream” has become an appealing career option for many young aspiring Koreans that did not go to America to study.

In light of S. Korea’s “lopsided” (according to Foreign Affairs) economic dependence with China, the Obama administration should consider whether South Korea would act against its own self-interest and side with Japan on any dispute between Japan and China.

Since Obama “won” the Nobel Peace Prize even before he was sworn into his first term, his foreign policy decisions were on many occasions mistaken because he chose the inferior fork on the road. Deciding to rely on Japan, as an ally to counter China, is one of these.

While most Americans are willing to forgive and forget Japan for its WWII atrocities—in truth, many are unaware of Japan’s dark past—people of Asia are unwilling to let Japan off the hook. Abe’s latest apology was a case in point. When Park announced the settlement, the people in Korea rose up on behalf of the surviving “comfort women” and strenuously objected on the grounds that Abe’s apology lacked sincerity, was deliberately vague and did not treat the victims with respect and dignity.

Japan’s response has been to complain that repeated apology has never been enough. After each apology, the critics find fault and demand another. Japanese officials would ask why Japan couldn’t be treated like Germany and not be subjected constant badgering for another apology. But the critics’ response has been that unlike Japan, the German’s apology was official and formal and they have always been ready to admit their collective guilt and never attempted to deny, recant or revise their history with the Jews.

After the Abe/Park agreement, the Korean American Forum of California (KAFC) also vigorously objected. One important objection raised by KAFC was that Abe’s apology needed to apply to victims of 11 nations and not just to the women of Korea. Thus, far from putting the history of WWII to bed, the people of Asia and anybody of conscience will not let Japan forget.

For Obama to pick Japan as an ally is to stand on the wrong side of history. It’s an undeniable fact that America has not always taken the principled high road. But to let Japan erase its past in the interest of expediency and perceived geopolitical advantage is to let the world know that the U.S. supports and condones heinous acts against humanity and could care less about the feelings of the people in Asia.

Obama has encouraged Abe to re-interpret Japan’s constitution and take on a more militarily aggressive stance. But surely a nation that will deny its past can’t be trusted to behave with honor in the future. Let’s hope Obama and the American people won’t have to rue the day Japan was encouraged to take up their sword again.