This book is published by Harvard Business Review and my review first appeared in Amazon.
If the authors had posited the rhetorical question from the geopolitical point of view, the short answer would be: "Yes, China can lead though not in the confrontational style favored by the Americans." When applied to doing business in China or by Chinese companies on the global stage as the authors intended, the answer is more nuanced and complex. The authors tried hard and deserve a "B" for their effort but they missed the bullseye.
If the authors had posited the rhetorical question from the geopolitical point of view, the short answer would be: "Yes, China can lead though not in the confrontational style favored by the Americans." When applied to doing business in China or by Chinese companies on the global stage as the authors intended, the answer is more nuanced and complex. The authors tried hard and deserve a "B" for their effort but they missed the bullseye.
This thought provoking book loaded with information and case
histories (in the tradition of Harvard Business School) is highly instructional
for those wishing to understand today’s China, especially the business
environment of China. While the authors provided a balanced discussion of the
complexity of a society undergoing breathtaking rate of change, the analysis
that accompanied the discussion was often too light and not fully satisfying.
The book began with a historical review demonstrating that
much of China’s centrally planned policies had the roots in the early republic
days as proposed by Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of modern China. Contrary
to Western perception, many of China’s policies were not invented by China’s
Communist Party but preceded CCP’s coming to power.
The authors then described the rapid development of China’s
economy alongside intensive investment in infrastructure that has been
unprecedented in human history. They attributed the success to China’s leaders being
trained in engineering, as opposed to emphasis in law as is the case with
western political leaders.
The book presented many successful business cases as well as
failures. Both categories included state-owned enterprises as well private ones
founded by entrepreneurs. Reasons for their success or failure were useful and
instructional. The book also talked about China’s rapid expansion of the
capacity to train college graduates and China as emerging source of outbound
foreign direct investments.
While the description of China’s impressive economic
progress was positive and fair in giving the policymakers their due, there was
an undertone of nagging concern that China’s miraculous development won’t last.
Because of China being a single party rule, they expect the nation to eventually hit the wall.
As I read the book, I kept waiting the other shoe to drop. That is, I waited
for an analysis and explanation of why China will ultimately fail but that
conclusion while hinted was never articulated.
It is somewhat unfortunate that the book went to press just
after the sentence of Bo Xilai. To the authors’ credit, they did not simply
dismiss Bo’s downfall as political infighting between his losing faction and Xi
Jinping’s winning faction—as some western pundits have suggested. Had they
waited a bit to see the full implication of the anti-corruption drive, still on
going today, they might have a more hopeful prognosis on China’s future.
I suppose it’s unrealistic for a less than 200 page book to
fully cover the many facets of China, some contradictory and conflicting, and
some too complex to lend to straightforward analysis. For example, the authors
devoted one paragraph on the likelihood of military conflict with the U.S. and
their concluding sentence was: To the extent
there is a Chinese-American competition, we believe it will be primarily
economic, not military, in nature. Wow, there were a lot of whys and
why-not’s that they didn’t talk about.
In discussing the rise of China, especially in the early
years after Deng Xiaoping return to power, the authors did not discuss the
critical (in my view) roles of Hong Kong businesses relocating into Shenzhen
and Taiwan manufacturing companies into Dongguan and Kunshan. They were in
China well ahead of significant western presence and their factories began
the knowledge transfer of good manufacturing practices to the indigenous
factories, heretofore indoctrinated by the “iron rice bowl” mentality wherein
quality and productivity did not matter.
While the book drew linkages to early republic days just
after the fall of the Manch dynasty, it barely mentioned the early signs of
privatized venture led by the so-called township enterprises (乡镇企业) in the early days
of economic reform. To my knowledge no one has really gone to the trouble of
figuring out why the TVEs had such meteoric rise and why they flamed out.
The book also did not talk about how failing SOEs were
“rescued” by some energetic entrepreneurs, usually an insider, taking the small
efficient part of the operation with greatly reduced payroll and restart as a
stock holding company. In exchange for a minority equity in the new company,
the local government was left to deal with closing and laying off the greater part of
enterprise beyond economic salvage. Some newly formed company raised capital by
agreeing to relocate to the outskirts and giving up the dilapidated facility
located in the heart of town to the local government for cash, whereupon the government
would raze the old factory and build new shopping mall or office building or high
rise apartments. Everybody won.
The round-trip funding of the newly formed privately held
company also played a critical role in the early days of economic reform.
“Round trip” refers to the secret transfer of funds from inside China to
Hong Kong and then remitted back to China as qualified foreign direct investment,
sometimes accompanied by addition of fresh funds from Hong Kong. The motivation
for the round tripping was that any enterprise with 25% or more equity
belonging to the foreign investor qualified as foreign invested enterprise and
FIEs were eligible for favorable tax treatment and other concessions.
“Above are rules, below are ways around the rules (上有政策,下有对策)” is one
saying everybody in China is familiar with. It is very much ingrained in the
Chinese business culture and something every western business in China needs to
keep in mind. The authors emphasized the importance of western companies understanding and getting along with the national and local governments in China. Very true. The challenge is that nothing in China is black or white but in shades of grey--nothing to do with sexual bondage but everything to do with staying out of FCPA related indictments back home. Knowing where the line is and not stepping over the line is the daily challenge for the expat manager.
While there was an impressive collection of cases presented
in this book, there were some gaps I could nit pick. For example in discussing China’s
rising trend to consumerism, they talked about the competition of Ford and GM
to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese consumer. Actually VW, who was in
China years before GM or Ford, has been much more a competitor to GM than
Ford. Breathing down their collective
necks are the local privately held entities as well as the big state-owned auto
companies that are in bed with the western automakers.
Also as part of the discussion on China’s rising
consumerism, the authors studied the use of credit card companies as a “growing appetite for consumer debt.”
Missing in the discussion is a much needed, more expansive study of the Chinese
consumer (or is it the government) that resisted the use of outside credit
cards such as Amex, Visa and MasterCard until the introduction of UnionPay, a Chinese version of a universal credit card. What
made UnionPay successful? What was the government’s role?
In fact, an entire new chapter could be devoted on how
Chinese companies emulated a successful western business and localize the model
in order to succeed in China. Examples would include Baidu over Google and
Alibaba over eBay and Amazon. The authors suggested that the government tilt
the field in favor of the Chinese companies but I believe there was more to it.
The Chinese entrepreneurs understood the local culture and practices and made
sure theirs was an approach that took advantage of their understanding. An
interesting case to watch for possible inclusion in their next edition of this
book will be the rise (and more rise or fall) of Xiaomi in the highly
competitive mobile phone market.
The authors devoted only one sentence to the turbine maker: Sinovel was also accused of stealing
proprietary wind turbine technology from its American main supplier. This
was somewhat misleading because the dispute was over alleged theft of software,
and as the authors rightly pointed out, software was not a strength of Chinese
companies. Actually the authors missed an opportunity to develop a case study
on how to develop a strategic partner and avoid a nightmare. (The damaged
American company was located in Massachusetts and should have been easy to
interview.) Instead of same bed, different dream, based on the Bloomberg
report, I suggested
that the American executive missed the opportunity to form a classic win-win
relationship, a virtue the Chinese love to extoll.
The authors are using this book for one of their China
related courses. It is a worthy first effort but I would expect future
revisions and editions, if for no other reason because China is still very much
a moving target. As I suggested in this review, to do justice to this subject,
the book needs to be much bigger, at least twice the number of pages
accompanied by more in-depth analysis.