This is the second of two commentaries on Taiwan, written before but in anticipation of KMT's midstream change in candidate for the president--originally posted in China-U.S. Focus.
Despite warming relations
between the mainland and Taiwan under seven years of Ma Ying-jeou’s
administration, around the corner, the cross-straits relationship could be in
for a period of deep freeze. Ma’s ineffective leadership is one obvious reason
but there are many other contributory causes for the gloomy overcast on the
Taiwan Straits.
When Ma won the presidential
election in 2008 by a landslide, Taiwan was a mess. Eight years under Chen
Shui-bian saw Taiwan’s economy stagnating and news of scandal and accusation of
wrongdoing pelted one after another.
Chen Shui-bian established
many firsts in Taiwan’s history. He was the first from Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) to wrestle the presidency from the then ruling Kuomintang (KMT),
and he was the first to win the seat with less than 40% of the popular vote. He
was the first to “survive” a last minute assassination attempt of doubtful
authenticity but garnered enough voter sympathy to be re-elected by the thinnest
of margins. He was also the first to go directly to prison for corruption after
he left office.
Over a million of Taiwan’s
best and brightest left Taiwan to establish residence on the mainland, to
invest and begin their businesses and to make their fortunes there. Chen did
not stop the investments across the straits but he also did not take advantage
of economic synergy with the mainland.
So long as the Taishang (Taiwan businessmen) going back
and forth did not try to influence the politics on Taiwan, i.e., did not
publicly extoll the virtues of cooperating with the mainland, Chen left them
alone. Instead Chen concentrated on every opportunity to line his pockets.
When he was finally put on
trial for massive corruption, he blamed the wrongdoings on his wife. And then,
in exchange for dismissing all the charges against him, he offered to
repatriate millions from off shore bank accounts back to Taiwan. The court merely
sent him to prison.
While being president, Chen promoted
his predecessor’s (Lee Teng-hui) policy of moving the people’s sentiments away
from China toward a native Taiwan identity. The textbooks deleted mention of Taiwan’s
common root in history and culture with China and emphasized the Taiwan dialect
as if it sprang from native soil, ignoring its origin from southern Fujian.
Chen even issued a new Taiwan passport without any reference to “Republic of
China.”
When Ma won the election and
returned the KMT to power, he promptly reversed many of Chen’s policy. He began
the cross-straits dialogue in earnest, leading to the signing of the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and 23 agreements related to economic
cooperation.
Ma began to welcome tourists
from the mainland. Today, Taiwan is becoming one of the more popular
destinations for China’s outbound tourists and China’s tourist spending
represents roughly a ten billion dollar benefit to Taiwan’s annual economy.
Despite Ma having won terms
favorable to Taiwan under ECFA and returned Taiwan to economic health, he
failed to influence the attitudes of the people on Taiwan that ranged from
being skeptical to hostile to the mainland. He was timid and unwilling to emphasize
the obvious to the Taiwan public, namely Taiwan’s economy was going to be
better off tied to China than not.
In 2013, Ma accused Wang
Jin-pyng of influence peddling and stripped Wang of his membership in the KMT.
Wang sued and regained his membership. Without his KMT membership, Wang would
no longer remain the speaker of the Legislative Yuan. The end result was an
irrevocably divided KMT.
Led by students, the
Sunflower movement in 2014 seemed to have discombobulated the KMT and exposed
Ma as a weak and indecisive leader. The efficient and highly organized
protesters stormed and occupied the Legislative Yuan and then the Executive
Yuan. They energetically objected to the passing of additional trade agreements
with China.
The student ideologues claimed
to worry more about losing their native identity because of closer integration
with China than jobs and economic wellbeing that the trade accord promised. Wang
promptly and unilaterally declared the intention not to act on the pending
trade pact and Ma was sidelined and remained silent.
Later in the year, the KMT
lost major municipal elections and Ma resigned his chairmanship of KMT. Eric
Chu, mayor of New Taipei City, was elected to replace Ma as the new chairman.
Out of the disarray emerged
an old face, Tsai Ing-wen, from the DPP to become the new favorite to win the
presidential election in 2016. Tsai ran
for the mayor of New Taipei City and lost to Chu in 2010 and ran for president
in 2012 and lost to Ma. But thanks to KMT’s implosion, Tsai suddenly became the
odds on favorite.
Self-inflicted damage is
nothing new to the KMT. The party split into two camps in the run up for the
2000 election, which enabled Chen Shui-bian to eke out a win with barely 39% of
the votes.
KMT’s proclivity for self-destruction
continues. First they nominated Hung Hsiu-chu to run against Tsai because no
one else wanted the nomination. Now the KMT is about to de-nominate Hung and
put Chu in her place because the party leaders suddenly realized that they couldn’t
afford to be routed by the DPP.
For obvious reasons, Beijing
can do even less to influence Taiwan’s drift away from unification than they
can with Hong Kong. To complicate matters further and not often discussed is
the presence of ethnic Japanese living in Taiwan but identified as Taiwanese.
As Taiwan’s first elected
president, Lee Teng-hui, has proudly proclaimed, he prefers to be known by his
Japanese name, Iwasato Masao, and his first language is Japanese. He has even
stated that Japan is Taiwan’s motherland.
Lee could be a tip of the
iceberg that could seed the coming freeze. After WWII, faced with returning to
an uncertain future in a devastated Japan, around 300,000 Japanese elected to
remain in Taiwan. They took on Chinese surnames and merged into the local
community.
My friend in Taiwan tells me
that this group of ethnic Japanese has multiplied into an estimated group of 2
million descendants. It would be natural to assume that most of the nearly 10%
of Taiwan’s population would not share any feeling of fealty to being a
Chinese. Harder to know is the actual fraction that has actually become anti
China/ pro Japan/ pro Taiwan independence agitators following Lee’s lead.
Early this month, Tsai made a
visit to Japan to meet with cabinet members and other leaders of Japan’s LDP.
She and Japan’s Prime Minister Abe are old friends and around lunchtime they
were seen entering and leaving the same Tokyo hotel separately. When questioned
by the media, they both denied that a clandestine meeting took place.
Assuming that Tsai wins the
expected landslide election and sweep the DPP into majority control of the
legislature, she is likely to take more independent actions, including meeting openly
with Japan’s Abe. Her mentor, Chen, has been released from prison earlier this
year. He was given a medical parole based on his being mentally unbalanced. With
a warm DPP embrace, I wouldn’t be surprised if Chen is suddenly no longer
psychologically disturbed and become active in politics again.
Beijing could be facing a
Taiwan with fewer options. Military threats have not had the desired effect and
economic incentives have not made many friends, especially among the youth. Japan
could join the U.S. and decide to actively interfere with the cross-straits
relationship.
Sadly, a long winter of
discontent looms ahead. The one glimmer of light is that the vast majority in
Taiwan still prefers the “status quo,” meaning no unification and no
independence. As is usually the case, the voice of the silent majority cannot
rise above the din of a noisy minority. But, if this majority understands the
implications of letting the protesters have their way, perhaps they will vote
against ice in favor of sunshine.