This entry is an revision of the previous blog entry to reflect that the summit between Obama and Xi had taken place and was first posted on China-US Focus.
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The informal summit between
the leaders of China and the US concluded pretty much according to most
expectations, namely no breakthroughs or unpleasant surprises.
According to some reports,
Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping did agree to work together on keeping
North Korea in check and the Korean peninsula nuclear free.
Indeed there have been some
recent developments to suggest that North Korea is apparently yielding to China’s
pressure to behave. The North Koreans have approached the South Korean
government to renew a dialogue that has gone on for years, more off than on.
Of course historically nothing
about North Korea has been predictable or dependable. The Pyongyang government
has always been able to exploit the difference in the policies regarding North
Korea between Beijing and Washington, a difference that gives Pyongyang room to
alternatingly test the patience of the two powers.
Despite or because of vocal
protests from the US, North Korea has apparently gone ahead with an underground
nuclear detonation—“apparently” because no one seems to know for sure.
Despite consternation from
Japan and South Korea along with pressure from the US, North Korea has
test-fired ballistic missiles in the direction of neighboring South Korea and
Japan. Some supposed intercontinental range missile turned out much shorter
range than expected and some were outright duds.
Each time after the
government has misbehaved on the international stage, it would offer to begin
the six party talks, provided of course the US will agree to preconditions that
the North Koreans know the US will not accept.
The only recourse Washington
seems to have is to lean on Beijing to get the North Korea to behave, since the
regime is completely dependent on the food and energy aid from China, without
which the regime would certainly collapse.
But China is equally
frustrated, if not more so, by the North Koreans. Each time Beijing sends a
special envoy to Pyongyang to ask the government not to build a bomb or not to
fire a missile, the Pyongyang would assure the envoy and then goes ahead and reneges
a few days after the envoy leaves. Sometime, the misbehavior takes place a
couple of days ahead of the arrival of the visiting delegation just to rub it
in.
Most recently, after the most
recent missile test and after finally releasing Chinese fishermen held by the
North Koreans—as this has happened more than once—Pyongyang promptly sent their
highest ranking military official to Beijing to again express proper contrition
and again promise to participate in the much desired six party talks.
North Korea’s seemingly
erratic behavior has been deliberate and carefully calibrated. It continues to
push and test the boundary of what China will tolerate, because Pyongyang knows
that China will not allow the regime to totally implode.
China has two major reasons
not wanting to see the Pyongyang regime collapse. First it would have to deal
with a massive refugee problem as Koreans flee north into China. Second,
presumably the Seoul government will take over and unify the entire peninsula.
This would mean potential American military presence all the way to the border
of China.
Up to now, Washington has
been badgering Beijing to fix the problem and make Pyongyang behave but has
offered nothing that would help Beijing get out of the conundrum.
But there is something the US
can offer to China that would help China exert pressure on North Korea more
effectively. Namely, the US can promise to immediately withdraw all its troops
from the Korean peninsula when and if the Pyongyang government collapses and
the South Korea government were to unify the peninsula.
It would take a lot more
mutual trust in the bilateral relations than currently exists between China and
the US before Beijing would accept the promise of American withdrawal as
realistic. However once confidence has been established, the Pyongyang
government would find much less room to be the bad actor. It would either have
to behave or face extinction.
Obama could point out to Xi
that since China normalized its relations with South Korea (to the
consternation of the North) in 1992, South Korea has become an important
economic partner of China and the bilateral relations have been cordial without
one-sided demands like those from the North.
If the Korean peninsula were
to unify under Seoul, China would have a friendly neighbor and enjoy a stable
relationship. With peace and stability being the common goal of China and the
US, there would be no further reason for an American military presence.
In order to convince Xi and
his Zhongnanhai colleagues that Obama is sincere, he would have to take steps
to build trust. The most prominent step would be to change his pivot to Asia,
which China regards as military containment, into a platform for joint high sea
patrols and exercises with the PLA Navy.
When realized, there are two important
benefits for Obama in addition to reining in North Korea. First, with sequestration,
Obama is facing a shrinking defense budget. He still has a war budget on al
Qaeda that needs to be fed. He does not have the funds to deploy troops in the
Pacific where the US faces no threat.
More
importantly, Obama should be thinking about his legacy to history. By brokering
a lasting peace with China and become partners in developing a stable Asia
Pacific, Obama would be remembered for altering the disastrous warpath toward
self destruction embarked by the previous Bush administration and putting
America back on a path to prosperity.
