A Tong Village in China

Book review: A Village with My Name by Scott Tong, University of Chicago Press, 2017

Scott Tong writes about his journey in search of his roots in China. Readers will find his descriptions full of whimsical humor and be charmed by his understated style as he tells of his search in the far-flung corners of China.

With the professional diligence of a journalist, he went to some obscure places and met with many everyday folks and wrote down the trials and travails of the Chinese people as they lived through some of the most tumultuous times in China.

Scott’s paternal grandfather left Shanghai on virtually one of the last leaky boats for Taiwan before the city fell to the People’s Liberation Army. He took Scott’s father, then a young boy, with him but left his then wife and younger son behind. This decision meant that Scott grew up with an all American life experience while his cousins in China suffered from deprivation and castigation as a direct consequence of their grandfather’s decision.

Scott’s maternal grandmother left for Hong Kong shortly after the Chinese Communist took over Shanghai. She had three young children with her; the youngest was Scott’s mother. Scott’s mother was seven at the time and she remembered her father seeing them off at the train station; neither side realized that they would not see each other again. Scott’s parents met in America and raised their family in America.

Between the post WWII period and the early years of Chinese Communist Party’s liberation of China, some of the Chinese with means departed from China. These were scholars that found academic appointment overseas, professionals that followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan or wealthy families that resettled in Hong Kong and neighboring parts of Southeast Asia.

To varying degrees, when this group of emigres read Scott’s stories, they will see reflections of the histories of their own families and the challenges, the hurt and tragedies their relatives faced; all during the era when China transformed from a state in disarray to a modern global power. Some of Scott’s stories are also their stories.

The author was born and raised in America and did not show early interest in his Chinese background. It was after he and his family lived in Shanghai for four years and had already returned to the U.S. that he began to research and search for his family roots in China. He was the founding China bureau chief for NPR Marketplace from 2006 to 2010. 

The book opens with Scott and his father in a van bouncing around a dirt road looking for a place named Fumaying, literally the military camp of the Emperor’s son-in-law. It was an obscure name in a brief moment of Ming dynasty history, named for a son-in-law of the founding Ming emperor (Fu Ma is the title of someone who married a princess). After the founding Ming emperor died, the throne was to pass to his grandson of his first-born son, but the martial fourth son and uncle of the newly anointed emperor swept down from Beijing to usurp the throne and the Fu Ma apparently perished in the cross fire. Soon after, the place faded into obscurity.

Miraculously, the author found some locals that passed him from one source to another to another until they found the village of Tongs near the site of the former Fumaying. From his distant relatives, he extracted the story of his great grandfather who studied in Japan and brought back a Japanese wife and that fact may or may not have saved the village from Japanese atrocities when the conflict began.

His maternal grandfather that his mother barely knew was an important part of Scott’s quest. He was arrested among the first wave of anti-rightest movement in the early ‘50s and sent to a remote and barren region of Qinghai. There he perished without leaving so much as a trace. Yet Scott flew to Xining, the capital of Qinghai and boarded daylong bus ride westward to where the long abandoned camp was supposed to be. He found people he could talk to that could help him frame a likely fate and as an act of closure, brought back handfuls of dirt to honor his grandfather’s memory.

The narrative of his travel and interviews are interwoven with the historical background and color that could only have been obtained from long hours in the library and visits to archives, both in China and in the U.S. Reading his book is to learn a lot about China’s recent history dating from the beginning of the republic era to the war with Japan to the civil war between the KMT and the CCP and then the early years of PRC.

He didn’t try to impress the reader with how hard he worked to tell his story and he didn’t tug at the reader’s heartstrings with some truly sad personal stories of his relatives. He just let them tell their stories. For example, his maternal grandfather put his wife and three children on the train to Hong Kong and said goodbye. Afterwards, he wrote to his children about his lonely feelings going back to an empty house. He fully expected to rejoin them soon.

Scott spent many hours talking to his uncle living in Shanghai. This uncle was the younger son Scott’s grandfather did not take to Taiwan. He grew up during the Cultural Revolution and suffered abusive treatment for having relatives living in Taiwan but he never expressed bitterness about his fate to Scott. Perhaps it is enough that he adopted his mother’s family name and is not a Tong. Yet despite whatever his feelings for the father that abandoned him, he was most hospitable to Scott and met with him frequently and did much to help him understand the China undergoing a revolutionary transformation.

As a U.S. trained journalist, the author could have followed the customary western preoccupation of looking under every carpet for dirt on China.  With the possible exception of James Fallows and Evan Osnos, most western media reports on China show compulsory bias to accentuate the negative, including some of Scott Tong’s own Marketplace reports from China. He himself said, “My time as a reporter in China led me to assume public offices were xenophobic, corrupt, or useless—or all three.”

Fortunately for this book, Scott encountered many willing to tell what it was like to live under the Japanese, Chiang’s Nationalist and Mao’s Communist regimes. By telling their stories simply without embellishments, his portrayals come across as genuine and authentic.

Parts of his book resonated with me. My father, the oldest of three brothers left for the U.S. shortly after WWII to continue his graduate studies. His youngest brother was a member of the KMT party and followed Chiang to Taiwan—also leaving a wife and children behind.

The middle brother was arrested by the CCP and sent to laogai camp in Qinghai around the time of Scott’s grandfather—even perhaps to the same camp. During the Great Famine, the oldest daughter took the youngest son to Hong Kong and met up with the third uncle who took them to Taiwan. The three siblings in the middle stayed in Shanghai with their mother and kept a low profile so as to avoid the verbal and physical abuse for having relatives in Taiwan and U.S.

Scott Tong’s book is a wonderful read and one can learn a lot about China from his multi-generational sagas. However, the reader should keep in mind that what happened to Scott’s family and relatives represent only a tiny fraction of the Chinese population. In the days of his grandparents, far less than one percent of the Chinese population went to college and even fewer went overseas for further education. These, along with the wealthy class, were the people that were persecuted by Mao, not the masses consisting of farmers and laborers.

The US can afford to take the first step toward North Korea

This piece was posted on Asia Times, September 7, 2017

ASIA TIMES

September 7, 2017

Mighty America must exercise magnanimity over North Korea

 By George Koo

At 100 kilotons, North Korea’s latest underground nuclear blast was around 10 times as great as the one last year and more than 100 times as great as its first underground test back in 2006. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has raised the stakes by claiming to have set off its first hydrogen bomb.

The US reaction has predictably been more of the same old. More condemnation. More sanctions. More threats of reprisals of overwhelming force. As if to set the stage for actual reprisal to come, Nikki Haley, the US ambassador to the United Nations, accused the North Koreans of “begging for war”.

For nearly two decades, America’s response to the DPRK has been to resort to ratcheting up the tension against it. In turn, the DPRK’s response to this increased pressure has been to detonate a bigger bomb or fire an intercontinental missile with longer range. Neither side has succeeded in getting the other to back down.

In early 1994, Bill Clinton’s White House began to contemplate making a pre-emptive surgical strike on Yongbyon, a location on the northeast coast of North Korea where weapons development was under way.

Cameramen film under the North Korean flag during a parade celebrating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, in Pyongyang, on October 10, 2015. Photo: Reuters / Damir Sagolj

According to Dr William Perry, then US secretary of defense, Pyongyang invited former president Jimmy Carter to visit North Korea, whereupon the North Koreans expressed to him that they had an interest in beginning negotiations. Carter promptly conveyed this sentiment to president Clinton.

War was averted and both sides quickly arrived at an “Agreed Framework” by the end of 1994. The basic terms of the Agreed Framework were that the DPRK would halt producing plutonium and not built large reactors that could be used to produce weapons-grade fissionable material. Japan and South Korea would each build a light-water reactor in the DPRK for power generation and the US would supply fuel oil until those reactors were built.

The framework held, albeit tenuously, until the end of Clinton’s second term. Perceptions and expectations of what the framework meant were very different on both sides. The North Koreans were hoping that it would lead to a bilateral treaty that would give them assurances of no US intention for regime change. A ceasefire armistice since the end of the Korean War seemed too flimsy to offer them a sense of security.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson speaks at a UN Security Council meeting on the situation in North Korea on April 28, 2017. Tillerson has allowed that he would be open to talks if certain conditions are met. Photo: Reuters / Stephanie Keith

The US side considered the framework as an informal agreement that would not require ratification by the US Senate – a way of keeping nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula out of domestic politics. In fact, persistent congressional opposition to the DPRK meant reduced funding for the fuel-oil shipments, causing delays and shortfalls in those shipments.

When George W Bush entered the White House, he was not interested in dealing with a member of the “axis of evil”. The bad blood came to a head in 2003 when an American delegation went to Pyongyang and, in a public confrontation without any pretense at diplomacy, accused the North Koreans of violating the Agreed Framework via covert nuclear-weapons development.

On its side, the DPRK had not seen any sign of the completion of the two light-water reactors promised nearly nine years earlier, and only intermittent deliveries of fuel oil. Each side had plenty of reason to accuse the other of dealing in bad faith. Distrust and suspicion have poisoned relations ever since.

In response to worldwide condemnation, the DPRK has cleaved to the line that its nuclear-weapon development is for self-defense and a “gift package” for the US. In point of fact, the North Koreans see no other recourse against the US threat of regime change. The fate of Muammar Gaddafi, of Libya, who publicly gave up nuclear weapons but was removed from power anyway, serves to remind them of the alternative fate awaiting.

As the imbroglio deepens, world opinion is shifting toward caution and moderation, not so much in sympathy for the puny underdog taking on the hegemon but out of concern that the confrontation, without a course correction, could lead to catastrophic consequences exceeding any rational imagination.

The people of South Korea are relatively blasé about the actions of their neighbor to the north because they believe they understand the North Koreans. They fear instead US President Donald Trump because of his unpredictability and the seeming opacity hiding his real intentions.

Their newly elected president, Moon Jae-in, has advanced the notion of continuing dialogue with the North. President Trump has accused Moon of appeasement, but surely as the next-door neighbor, South Korea has more at stake than the US, which exists in relative safety thousands of kilometers away.

Moon is not the only one to suggest letting talks begin. Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping of China, while joining in the near-universal disapproval and condemnation of the DPRK, have also proclaimed that negotiation is the only viable approach.

Even the mainstream media in the US are coming to the same conclusion: namely that talks are necessary to reduce the tension. Key members of the Trump team such as Secretary of Defense James Mattis would not rule out diplomatic solutions. State Secretary Rex Tillerson has allowed that he would be open to talks if certain conditions are met.

With 12 times the population of North Korea, and military and economic power of a much greater magnitude of multiples, it would seem that mighty America can afford the magnanimity of making the first gesture of accommodation. But even then, the US diplomatic effort would need infinite patience to gradually overcome the years of bad blood and distrust.

Perhaps another high-profile emissary to Pyongyang is needed to break the ice. Instead of former president Jimmy Carter, might not Bill Clinton fill the bill? As I have suggested previously, it’s time to think and act differently about North Korea.

Time to think and act differently on North Korea

Edited version first appeared in Asia Times.

North Korea’s latest missile test—with the range to threaten American cities—has put the Trump Administration between wishful thinking and a hard place. Too bad neither represents a realistic resolution of the conundrum.

The easy way out, for the U.S. at least, is to “let China do it.” Trump, Secretary of State Tillerson, Defense Secretary Mattis and UN Ambassador Haley have in unison chanted the same basic mantra. Namely, problem solved if only China would apply more pressure on North Korea.

Unfortunately, this naïve wishful thinking is based on several false premises.

First there is no evidence that China can tell North Korea what to do.  The two countries are not buddies and there is no love lost between China’s President Xi ‘s and Kim Jong Un. They have not met since both leaders came to power and they communicate via messengers.

China has joined the chorus in support of the UN resolution strongly condemning North Korea. The Kim regime no more pays heed to China than it has to protests from South Korea, Japan and United States.

Just as China cannot stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapon and intercontinental missile technology, North Korea is not developing those technologies for China’s sake. North Korea needs nuclear strike capability in order to be taken seriously by the U.S.     

To date sanctions on North Korea have not deter them. The American response has been to ask the UN Security Council to impose more sanctions. In particular, Trump does not feel that China is tightening the screws hard enough.

Shutting down North Korea’s economy might bring Kim to heel from the American perspective but clearly unacceptable from China’s view. Economic collapse would trigger a massive humanitarian crisis and China would be left to deal with the refugees since migrating north into China would be the only viable option.

There is also a flip side to this approach. Even if the sanctions do indeed bring North Korea to its knees, it does not mean that the Kim regime would become more conciliatory. Kim may decide that he has nothing to lose and simply launch an attack on the south.

The other hard approach is to launch a Rumsfeldian shock and awe on North Korea before the north can begin their attack.

There is no chance that carpet-bombing of unprecedented scale could vaporize the array of artillery and missiles facing South Korea. The consequent damage on Seoul and other parts of South Korea from the retaliation would be significant, not to mention the danger to the 30,000 American troops stationed in the south.

There is also no assurance that any precision strikes could successfully take out Kim and his inner circle nor knock out all the nuclear weapons and development centers. The risks of failure are simply to too great to contemplate.

There is a more sensible approach and increasing number of commentators and foreign policy observers are suggesting for the Trump Administration to consider. And, that is why not offering to sit down and talk without preconditions?

North Korea fears the U.S. and knows that Beijing cannot speak for nor commit on behalf of Washington. Pyongyang wants to deal directly with Washington and does not see China as a credible intermediary. Why not begin a direct conversation?

The Clinton Administration almost reached an agreement with Pyongyang when the clock ran out on his term of office. The incoming George W. Bush elected to ignore North Korea and then imposed preconditions before being willing to resume negotiations.

Pyongyang saw the Bush White House as dealing in bad faith and that the only way to gain American respect was to complete the development of the nuclear bomb. North Korea detonated their first nuclear bomb in October 2006. (George W came into office in 1999.)

The Obama administration unfortunately elected to follow his predecessor’s line. Namely, no agreement to negotiate unless North Korea first agreed to abide by certain preconditions and in lieu of North Korean agreeing, Washington bandied the threats of sanctions and solicited Beijing for their help.

In the intervening 16 years since the end of the Clinton administration, Washington and Pyongyang have made no progress to reaching a common understanding. Each accused the other of acting in bad faith. The U.S. threatened more sanctions; North Korea kept testing weapons with bigger bang and missiles with longer range.

This endless cycle is clearly not getting anywhere.  The threat of American shock and awe is clearly what worries Pyongyang. Why can’t Washington soften a bit and show a willingness to talk without preconditions? What have we got to lose?

Will the world respect us less as a fearsome hegemon because we are willing to swallow our pride, or will the world applaud us for being willing to make the first move towards peace? Donald Trump has an opportunity to accomplish an important foreign policy triumph that has eluded his two predecessors.

For a more detailed review of the complicated history between China and North Korea, go to here.

Graham Allison’s Thucydides’s Trap is about how America can avert the War with China

An edited version of the discussion on Graham Allison's book first posted on Asia Times.

The just published book called “Destined for War” addresses the question: “Can America and China escape Thucydides’s Trap?” Given the state of tension between the two powers, the publication is timely and the subject matter vitally important.

Coined by author Graham Allison, the Thucydides trap is based on the “History of Peloponnesian War” written by historian Thucydides who observed that a rising Athens inevitably came to blows with a ruling Sparta.

Allison is the founding dean of Harvard Kennedy School, eminent scholar and prominent adviser to the federal government on matters related to defense and national security. He and his students reviewed the past 500 years of history and identified 16 cases of a rising power facing a reigning power. Twelve of those cases ended in disastrous wars.

The book is a tour de force on identifying all the different ways a rising power and a reigning power can collide despite the best of intentions and despite conscious efforts to avoid war. Some times the process begins with a trivial misunderstanding that magnified with each reaction until open conflict becomes inevitable.

One of his chapters was devoted to conjectures of how a war between China and the US could develop. Various scenarios begin with a minor provocation misunderstood by the other side, which leads to a response in turn misunderstood and thus an escalating series of thrust and parry until the two countries stand at the brink of nuclear holocaust. 

The author did not intend to sell his book as a prophesy of doom but to make sure that his cautionary tale is sufficiently frightening, so that readers will take the threat of conflict seriously and more importantly leaders in Beijing and Washington will be sufficiently alarmed to avoid the trap. 

As his four no-conflict cases demonstrated, war between a rising power and reigning power does not have to be inevitable. Allison suggests that China and the US face four “mega threats” that would require their working together rather than in opposition, and in so doing help them avert falling into the trap.

The first is the threat of mutual assured destruction from a nuclear Armageddon. Both sides should be deterred from an all out nuclear war from which there can be no winners. This is the same deterrent that kept the 70 years of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union from getting hot.

Along the same lines, both powers have the same interest in keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of as many nations as possible and out of the hands of terrorists. He calls this scenario “nuclear anarchy.” Joint efforts would naturally be more effective in preventing nuclear anarchy than working separately. 

Both also face terrorism based on biological weapons derived from genetic engineering. “Extensive cooperation, through bilateral intelligence sharing, multilateral organizations and the establishment of global standard will be essential,” said Allison.

The fourth common mega threat identified by Allison was combating emission of greenhouse gases to stop global warming. The President of the U.S. has said, “This is not going to happen.” Oh well, three out of four should be enough for leaders of Beijing and Washington to choose collaboration rather than competition. 

On his book tour at Stanford, Allison and his moderator and former colleague at Harvard, Niall Ferguson, joked that the Chinese leaders follow western ideas and thinking closely and most have already read this book even before it was published—suggesting another case of piracy (ha-ha). Both lamented that the Trump White House is unlikely to have read the book and probably never will. 

Sitting in the audience, I asked whether a model of one hand clapping could still evoke the risk of falling into the Thucydides’s trap. I was hoping that they would take the cue to discuss the dominant US role as the provocateur in face of  a relatively passive reaction from China. Allison understood my question but he simply said that China’s island building activity in the South China Sea could create two hands clapping required by the trap.

Allison admits that his expertise is in national security and not on China. I believe seeing China from a western frame of reference is a significant flaw of his book. While he acknowledges a China as a 5000-year Confucian based civilization, he seems to attribute China with the same zero-sum mentality of a western nation.

All sixteen cases of Thucydides’s trap involved western nations. Japan was the rising power in two of the cases, but I would argue that Japan became a rising power after they decided to vigorously adopt all manner of western values and thus should be counted as a westernized nation.

As Michael Wood, award-winning producer of documentaries on major world civilizations, concluded at the end of his series that only the western civilizations went around killing each other and slaughtering others to extinction.

China does not send battleships to the Caribbean nor surveillance planes off the coast of California. China’s presence in the Middle East has been to help restore and rebuild infrastructure. The soldiers China dispatches overseas wear the blue UN helmet and serve as peacekeepers under UN auspices.

Washington gasped in alarm when China finally established its first offshore military base outside of China. China justified their base in Djibouti on the horn of Africa as needed to support their naval ships on patrol as part of the multinational efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Africa.

China’s heavy-handed influence on Djibouti was to lay a fresh water pipeline in the country and connect the coastal port with a railroad to Addis Ababa, capitol of landlocked Ethiopia. This is an example of China’s strategy to “dominate” the world, namely helping other countries build their infrastructure via the Belt and Road Initiative.

The author is rightly concerned about world and American national security. I respectfully submit that the hand doing the clapping, namely the United States, is the reigning power that can do the most to cease and desist their aggressive actions and thus avert the infamous trap.

China Comes to MIT

An edited version appeared in Asia Times.

“China Comes to MIT” is an exhibit celebrating the 140-year history of students from China that attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology. On display at the Maihaugen Gallery in the MIT Library until November, the exhibit contains an amazing collection of personal stories of students from China that attended MIT from 1877 to 1931. Along with individual profiles, the exhibit also explains the circumstances and developments that led to the special relationship between China and MIT.

Eight of the first nine to enter MIT from China were members of the Chinese Education Mission, sent by the Qing government to receive an American college education. The CEM was the result of Yung Wing’s tireless effort with the imperial court promoting the idea of exposing China’s youth to western education.

Yung, under the generous sponsorship of American missionaries, was the first Chinese to graduate from an American university—Yale, class of 1854. He recognized the value of a western education in helping China modernize and convinced the government to send young boys, ages 12 to 15 to live with missionary families in New England and begin their American education.

The first Chinese student to matriculate MIT was Mon Cham Cheong in 1877 just ahead of the young men from CEM. Cheong’s father was a progressive minded, wealthy merchant who sent him to the US under the guardianship of a similarly wealthy merchant in Boston. Thus Cheong was also the first self-funded student from China.

In all, stories of 38 individuals were profiled in the exhibit including the bio of the first Chinese woman to enter MIT. She was Li Fu Lee; she married Kuan Tung (MIT ’27) and followed him to MIT. She entered as a junior and received an electrical engineering degree in 1929. There were only 25 women in her class and she was made chairman of the social committee of the MIT Chinese Students’ Club—already enough attending to have a club.

The Wong Tsoo story was my personal favorite. Also known as Wong Tsu, he was among the first batch of students to graduate from the newly formed department of Aeronautical Engineering in 1916. Upon recommendations of others at MIT, William Boeing hired him sight unseen to be his first chief engineer.

In less than a year, Wong had designed a seaplane that Boeing sold 50 copies to the US Navy and that was how the Boeing Company got its start as an airplane manufacturing enterprise. (Maybe this is why as a MIT undergrad, I could always get a summer job at Boeing when I went home for the summers.)

Wong did not stay in Seattle very long but went back to China in the latter half of 1917. For services rendered, Boeing gave him a check for $50.77 as payment in full. The MIT exhibit picked up the rest of his story.

Upon arrival in China, Wong began to design and build many more planes while moving his factory several times to the interior to keep out of the grasp of invading Japanese troops. Because of the shortage of strategic materials during wartime, he even designed and built gliders out of bamboo for use as troop carriers.

Wong had a MIT classmate who shared his passion for aviation and was his partner in operating the first airplane factory in China. Japanese spies assassinated him and Wong took over managing the plant and adopted his friend’s son

He shared his enthusiasm for aeronautics by teaching in Tsinghua’s engineering college where he actively encouraged promising aeronautical engineers to pursue additional training at MIT. One of his students was Qian Xuesen, who would later become the father of China’s rocket science.

The MIT exhibit isn’t just about individual stories; it’s a comprehensive portrayal of China’s fascination with practical education available in the west at the turn of the 20^th century. After a century of humiliation at the hands of the western powers in the 19^th century, every aspiring student in China dreamed of additional training in the west so that they could acquire the skills needed to modernize China and catch up with the rest of the world.

As pointed out in the exhibit, “by 1914, engineering had become the favorite field for government students (i.e., funded by the Chinese government). In the eyes of many, engineering was not simply a practical skill, but a means of serving the nation.”

In 1914, MIT had 33 students from China, more than any other school in America. This tradition continues today. With a total enrollment of nearly 13,000 undergrad and graduate students, 30% are international students from over 140 countries. Nearly one out of every four comes from China; at a total of 888, China has more than twice the number from second place India.

Professor Emma Teng, head of MIT Global Studies and Languages, curated this exhibit. It’s obvious that she has put a lot of thought and energy in assembling the different parts of the display. The exhibit is a treasure trove of historical information and personal stories. Not everyone will be able to visit the display but all will be fascinated by the content of the companion website, www.chinacomestomit.org.

Sino American Relations Since Ping-Pong Diplomacy

Published in 2016 annual issue of Diplomatist (India)

On April 6,1971, the 31^st World Table Tennis Championship took place in Nagoya, Japan. Today, not many would remember the outcome of the international competition but the world remembers an act of friendship that led to “the week that changed the world.”

When an American player missed his bus after practice and the Chinese players invited him to ride in theirs, the athletes became friends. When this encounter was reported back to Beijing, China’s leader Mao Zedong promptly invited the American team to tour China after Nagoya.

The White House interpreted Mao’s invitation as a clear signal that China was interested in re-establishing relations with the U.S. In response, President Richard Nixon sent Henry Kissinger to Beijing to secretly arrange for Nixon’s visit to China.

Nixon went to China in February of the following year and he wrote that his diplomatic breakthrough with China was the week that changed the world. The encounter that led to his visit became known as Ping-Pong diplomacy. History would remember the event as the beginning of a new bilateral relationship between China and the U.S.

Cynics in the West attributed the entire matter to calculated manipulation by Mao rather than innocent friendship between athletes. Then again, pundits in the West tend to see ulterior motives related to anything that China does.

In reality, officials from China and the U.S. had been maintaining low-level diplomatic contacts for sometime and both sides had reached the conclusion that resuming official diplomatic relations was of mutual interests.

President Nixon felt that it was not realistic to isolate a quarter of the world’s mankind indefinitely and Mao realized that Nixon wanted to get out of the Vietnam quagmire and could use China’s help. Both were interested in forming a united front in face of a common adversary, namely the Soviet Union.

Shanghai Communiqué

At the end of Nixon’s visit in China, the U.S. and the PRC jointly issued the Shanghai Communiqué. In the Communiqué, the U.S. acknowledged that there was only one China and that Taiwan was a part of China. This acknowledgement was absolutely essential to China in order for Nixon’s visit to be considered a success.

The Communiqué has indeed served the bilateral relations well. Every US president since Nixon has pledged to honor the terms contained in the joint agreement. Despite or perhaps because of the latitude for interpretation by the ambiguity in the document, Beijing has been sufficiently reassured by the American pledge.

To the Chinese, the American pledge means that the U.S. will not interfere in the evolving development of the cross-straits relations between Taiwan and the mainland. Washington would add to China’s understanding with “so long as the cross-straits relations proceed peacefully.”

Formal normalization

The next milestone in the U.S. China relations was the formal normalization between the two countries on January 1, 1979. One can see the greatest importance Beijing placed on this agreement for normalization when the People’s Daily splashed the news in the form of a proclamation, printed in a special one-page extra edition in bold red ink. The only previous occasion when such a special edition was published was to announce the detonation of China’s first atomic bomb (and much later when China put a man in space).

Mao died in 1976 and by 1979, Deng Xiao-ping had returned to power and he celebrated the normalization with a grand tour of the U.S. in mid January. Despite his diminutive physical stature, he was a media sensation. Photos of Deng wearing a ten-gallon cowboy hat charmed the American public. What followed after Deng’s visit was a decade long honeymoon in Sino American relations.

While Deng got the bilateral relations off on an up-beat note, he was busy leading the reform of China’s economic policy. Where the central planners used to set the production goals and allocate the resources, now state control was gradually loosened. China went through a transitional phase when it was called a market economy with socialist characteristics. Eventually China dropped any pretense and simply referred theirs as a market economy.

Deng begins reform

During this period, the world came to know Deng by a number of his favorite aphorisms. By “to get rich is glorious,” Deng was recognizing that as market dynamics were allowed to exert their influence on the economy, some individuals would become wealthy before others. He saw that it was inevitable and the country would be better off than when everybody remained equally poor under Mao.

“It doesn’t matter if it’s a white cat or black cat, so long as it catches mice, it is a good cat.” This expression was a salute to pragmatism as Deng decided to move away from total state control to policies that will encourage individual initiative and entrepreneurism.

“Crossing the river while groping for the stones,” reflected the experimental nature of the policy changes that Deng had embarked. Sometimes this meant one small cautious step at a time and measure the impact before taking another. Other times, policy changes were applied to a small region to fully understand the impact before introducing the change on a national scale.

These quotes reflected Deng’s move away from ideology and dogma toward a pragmatic approach that was to stimulate China’s economy and set China on the road of more than three decades of double-digit growth. Deng’s pragmatism meant allowing foreign direct investments to participate in China’s economy, i.e., opening some windows even if it meant letting in some (Western) flies.

Tiananmen resets the relations

The next major marker in the Sino-American relations was June 4, 1989. The previous nightfall and early dawn was when the People’s Liberation Army tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square and dispersed the student protesters gathered there. On the way to the square, some PLA soldiers were assaulted and some bystanders and protesters were shot and killed. To this day, official tally of the casualty is not known.

Ironically, Soviet leader Gorbachev made a state visit to Beijing that May with a large contingent of western media in tow. The media noticed a ragtag group of student protesters in Tiananmen that had been there since April.

The students had been protesting official corruption and unfair and arbitrary job assignment following their graduation. After interacting with the western media, the student protest was energized and turned into a full-blown protest, ostensibly in quest of democracy.

After Gorbachev returned to Moscow, the media stayed behind to follow the student protest that in part they had inadvertently rekindled. Thus in the confrontation that ensued, the western media had front row seats to witness the shootings, the bloodied civilians, the bodies on the street and the world famous image of the lone young man standing in front of a column of tanks.

The world was shocked by the images shown on their TV as transmitted live from Beijing. China was loudly condemned for gross violation of human rights. Some members of the U.S. Congress were particularly vehement and vociferous.

Gorbachev was a mere two years away from presiding the total implosion and disintegration of the Soviet Union. The USSR menace had been fading for some time and therefore so was the importance and relevance of the Sino American alliance to oppose the USSR. Tiananmen marked the end of the long Sino-American honeymoon.

Overseas Chinese invests in China

After the Tiananmen debacle, some of the western companies already in China hesitated or even retreated from China. Deng strived harder than ever to open up China with economic reform. His historic tour of Shenzhen in 1992 as one of the first Special Economic Zones launched the transformation of a sleepy fishing village into an eventual megapolis that was to become more Hong Kong than even Hong Kong.

A popular notion was that the developed countries with advanced economies and technologies came pouring into China in response to the open windows. In reality, for the first decade after Deng’s southern tour, the major influx of foreign direct investments did not come from the West.

The first chunk of FDI came over the border from Hong Kong Chinese industrialists. They were the first to move their manufacturing operations to Shenzhen and surrounding area to take advantage of the lower wages and to enjoy various incentives.

The Taiwan companies were the next wave to follow and move their operations into China. Their lines of businesses, such as electronics, were generally more sophisticated than the Hong Kong products. Both groups of investors enjoyed not only government incentives but also the ability to operate in an environment of a common language and culture.

Often overlooked and not given enough credit, these Hong Kong and Taiwan companies introduced good manufacturing practices into China and helped raise the quality and productivity of the workforce in China. Local Chinese operations were forced to discard the lackadaisical attitudes ingrained by years of state control (popularly known as iron rice bowl mentality) and raise their productivity in order to compete.

By the time western companies entered China in significant numbers to set up their manufacturing plants, the effectiveness of the Chinese workforce already had the benefit of a decade or more learning from the presence of Hong Kong and Taiwan companies.

Beginning of the age of terrorism

When bin Laden’s gang of terrorist attacked New York’s world trade center on September 11, 2001, a lot had already changed in the Sino-American relations.

The neoconservatives in the U.S. saw the collapse of Soviet Union as the opportunity to project American might and move toward world domination as the sole superpower standing. Others in need of a replacement adversary to continue to justify the massive allocation for the national defense budget began to look at China as the most likely candidate.

The idea of American hegemony and a strong military budget often goes hand in hand among policymakers in Washington. They were the same folks that believe a shock and awe blitzkrieg in Iraq would lead to quick celebration of American soldiers as liberators in Baghdad—a horrendous miscalculation that continues to exact a toll in human suffering today.

Thus consistent with a warmongering mentality, politicians from the left and right derived political profit by attacking a demonized China and accusing their opponent of not being tough on China. At every presidential election, aspiring candidates invariably attacked the incumbent for being soft on China.

Once the winning candidate moved into the White House, the newly elected president had to face the reality that the relationship with China was too important to be treated as a throwaway piece in the game of domestic politics.

By 9-11 2001, China’s economy, doubling every 7 years, had become too large to dismiss in the name of politics. Its economy fueled by low cost labor and being export driven complemented perfectly with the U.S. economy driven by conspicuous consumption that needed low cost imports from China.

Economists, not politicians, observed that the two economies were just like Siamese twins joined at the hip. Killing one would be fatal to the other. Some members of Congress, knowing full well that there is no downside to criticizing China, have taken full advantage to pummel China for political points from their constituents.

Thus as the world watched in horror the collapse of the twin towers in lower Manhattan, China’s president Jiang Zemin called George W. Bush at the White House to express his condolences and offer China’s solidarity with the U.S. in the fight against the radical jihadists. Surely, Jiang must have thought that now that the Americans have a real enemy, they can direct their vitriol away from China.

Indeed, in the name of war on terror, Americans marched into Iraq and Afghanistan and now have their hands full dealing with the mess that they created. It was beginning to look like falling into another Vietnam quagmire that will take a long time to extricate. It became more important to get along with China than not.

Financial crisis of 2008

Then came the world financial collapse of 2008. This crisis was caused by the funny money schemes such as credit default swaps and mortgage-backed securities created by the wizards of Wall Street. The crisis caught the world by surprise.

To keep the giant multinational banks that were too big to fail from failing, the U.S. government injected massive amounts of dollars to give the banks enough liquidity to keep their heads above water.

To protect China’s economy from being swamped by the global financial tsunami, Beijing invested heavily in domestic infrastructure projects, such as superhighways, bridges, high-speed rail, ports and airports.

At the end of the crisis, the U.S. government saved its economy and recovered the funds lent to the banks in distress. China got a breathtaking leap in infrastructure improvements that continue to fuel the growth of their economy.

Most damaging of all, the crisis shook Beijing’s faith and confidence in Washington and in the stability of the dollar. To reduce their holdings and exposure to the dollar, China has entered numerous currency swap agreements with many of its trading partners and by-pass having to settle trade transactions in dollars.

Barrack Obama was elected president in 2008 and inherited two hot potatoes. In his eight years, he managed to tame one of them, the financial demon that threatened to sink the U.S. economy and right the ship at home.

On the international front, he was far less successful. Not only did he not end the conflict of Afghanistan and Iraq as pledged in his campaign, Obama’s foreign policy had allowed and even encouraged Islamic terrorism to spread uncontrollably to Syria, Egypt and Libya.

Given the full plate, one would assume that the U.S. would seek to find accommodation with China’s rise, but the opposite has been true. The neocon hawks in Washington has been anticipating, almost gleefully, the inevitable Thucydides Trap between a rising power and the reigning power.

The Trap presaged the collision and conflict between China and the U.S. However, that a rising power and a reigning power must resort to killing each other is very much a western idea based on western experiences tracing back to the days of Athens vs. Sparta. It remains to be seen how far the U.S. can push China into a corner before China gets exasperated enough to become a western state and fight back.

China’s way forward

Partly motivated by not holding vast reserves of US dollars, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, has been offering a different kind of international relations with his “one belt, one road” initiative along with the formation of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. He is offering to apply China’s experience and expertise in infrastructure projects gained since 2008 to build along the maritime and land silk roads from China to Europe. These projects could be financed by AIIB along with other development banks.

Xi is not going around giving away foreign aid packages. The beneficiary countries would be co-participants and co-investors in the infrastructure projects.  The projects would have to be economically sound with reasonable prospect of payback. Xi believes infrastructure investments will improve the local economy. Eventually the improved economies would be integrated for the benefit of all the economies on the belt or road.

Many countries are already seeing the appeal of being part of Xi’s win-win collaboration. U.K. was the first to ignore Washington’s contrarian advice and rushed to become the first western power to be a founding member of AIIB. When Xi made his state visit to London in late 2015, the British government rolled out the red carpet to make sure that Xi got the message, namely, U.K. considers China’s friendship to be of their highest priority.

The newly elected president Rodrigo Duterte of Philippines seemed to agree with U.K.’s point of view. He has shunned the confrontation on the contested island in the South China Sea favored by his predecessor and signaled a willingness to talk the matter over with China. He too sees value in collaborating with China and being included in the maritime silk route.

Choices for India

For non-aligned nations such as India, there is a choice. On the one hand, India can seek the security that comes with being protected by the military might of Uncle Sam, subject, of course, to Uncle Sam’s whim on whether defending India continues to be in his national interest. Since the U.S. already spends beyond their means for the military, India would be expected to contribute their share of the burden.

America’s reassurance to India on the ties that bind would be based on the fact that both have a democratic form of government. The people of India should be in the excellent position to decide on their own as to how well democracies have worked for them in the past and can function in the future.

On the other hand, India can seek to become an economic partner with China and collaborate on infrastructure development. China will not seek to interfere with how India is governed nor insist on entering into military alliances. India would simply benefit from China’s experience in building and completing giant projects on time and under budget—something democracies are not good at.

Of course, developing relations with China and the U.S. are not mutually exclusive. Keeping friendly relations with both superpowers will simply require skillful diplomacy and bearing in mind that the expectations from the two will be very different.

Just June this year India along with Pakistan has signed the necessary memorandum to be admitted as member nations of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017. SCO has been evolving since it was established 15 years ago with China and Russia as the prime movers. Other current members include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. With Iran expected to be the next member to be admitted, the SCO alliance will soon cover a huge part of Asia and nearly half of the world’s population.

The primary aim of SCO is to promote mutual cooperation in safe guarding the military and economic security of its members. Non-interference of the internal affairs of the member states is part of the charter. Obviously it is an alignment not designed to please Washington. (The American application to be an observer was rejected in 2005.)

In joining SCO, India shows that it already knows how to hedge its bet. Xi is betting that more countries will see economic cooperation to be more aligned to their national interest than military confrontation favored by the United States.