Huawei’s
debacle with US Congress raises troubling questions at many levels. Huawei will
be paying a heavy price for a colossal failure to communicate across the two
cultures, but this story is more than about just one company.
Huawei
initiated the dialogue by inviting a Congressional investigation of its company
operations. The House Select Committee on Intelligence responded but did not
give Huawei officials the desired endorsement. Instead, the House Committee
specifically recommends that the US government and private sector entities do
no business with Huawei on the ground that their equipment constitutes a
national security risk--a devastating hit on Huawei’s reputation that could hurt
Huawei’s business around the world.
Based
on the company’s past engagements in the US market, Huawei should have anticipated
a hostile reception. Its past attempts to make a minority investment in a
floundering 3Com and an acquisition of a relative start-up were stymied by the
US government as a perceived threat to the US national security.
The
company is said to have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on consultants
and Washington lobbyists to help Huawei deal with the Congressional committee.
Apparently these advisors did not appreciate the rather formidable built-in
bias Huawei needed to overcome. Drawing from their investigative report, it is
clear that the Committee began on the presumption that Huawei represents a real
threat to national security. Nothing in the eleven-month investigation changed
their minds.
Just
the mere possibility that cyber espionage can take place via Huawei equipment
was enough to brand Huawei a risk to national security. To overcome the bias, Huawei
would have had to prove that Huawei equipment could never host cyber attack against
the US, obviously not a stand Huawei could take credibly.
By
way of mitigating the Committee’s concern, Huawei offered to have all their
equipment thoroughly tested and certified by an independent laboratory before
the equipment could be introduced into the US market similar to the arrangement
accepted by the government of Great Britain. The Congressional Committee rejected
Huawei’s proposal for the following reasons: (1) The US market is too large for
any testing to be sufficiently comprehensive. (2) The testing only applies to
the configuration being tested but the configuration could be altered
subsequently during installation or later upgrades. (3) Such a certification
can even encourage a false sense of security and reduced vigilance. In other
words, there was no way for Huawei.
The
Committee asked Huawei to provide information on their contracts, pricing
practice for their products and services and scope of their operations and, recognizing
the sensitive nature of the information being sought, offered to receive such
information under a confidentiality agreement. Apparently, Huawei did not have
the confidence that Congress could keep information confidential and refused to
comply. Thus the Committee concluded that Huawei might be selling “at least
some of its products in the United States below the costs of production,”--a huge
leap indeed based on information the Committee did not get.
The
Huawei officials also failed to established empathy with the House Committee—to
put it mildly. Given a Congressional
body with no understanding of China or at least none that they would admit to,
empathy may have been too much to aspire. The Committee could not even make a
distinction between state owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned ones.
Somehow in their minds, a large successful private enterprise must be connected
to the Chinese government, and a sinister connection at that.
They
insisted on wanting to know about how Ren Zhengfei, Huawei’s founder, was able
to leave his SOE employer to start his own company, as if that was unheard of,
while actually in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, people in China were leaving
SOEs in droves. How was Ren invited to attend the 12th National
Congress, the Committee asked? Huawei’s answer should have been: Jiang Zemin
began to recognize the important role of entrepreneurs in China’s economy and
selectively honored them by inviting some to the national confab.
The
House Committee’s conclusion on Huawei, as its report readily admitted, was
based on hypotheticals and not on specific illegal acts committed by the
company. The hypotheticals are easy to conjure. However, the only known successful
cyber attack the world knows for certain is the deployment of American made
Stuxnet worm on the Iranian centrifuges. Certainly Americans have the bona
fides to imagine how cyber attacks can be done.
The
Internet is populated with screaming accusations from network security
consultants—undoubtedly looking for work—pointing to China as the source of
rampant cyber attacks, thus providing cover for Congressional paranoia. The
Committee does claim to have smoking guns describing Huawei wrongdoings but
these are classified and not available to the public.
In a
way, this is reminiscent of the Cox Committee’s investigation in the late
1990’s on the alleged espionage activities of Chinese in America. The
unclassified part of the Cox Committee report painted a lurid picture of
Chinese espionage running amuck in America. Tens of thousand storefronts in America
registered to Chinese entities were cells and every ethnic Chinese was a
potential spy for China. The Cox Committee also assured the public that they
had smoking guns though consigned to the classified section of the report and not
available to the public.
By
now the smoke from the Cox Report has largely dissipated and the only concrete
result was the arrest of Los Alamos scientist, Dr. Wen Ho Lee. He spent nine
months in solitary confinement before the presiding judge apologized to Lee and
threw out the case. The legacy of the hysteria created by the Cox Committee
investigation is a lingering suspicion of the loyalty of Chinese Americans and the
erosion of the idea that US Congress behaves honorably.
Sadly,
politicians have continued to find profit in taking pot shots at China. The incumbent
President Obama, a Nobel Peace laureate no less, proclaimed a military pivot to
Asia, and thus encouraging conflict in the waters around China, to show that he
is not soft on China. His opponent, Romney, promises to declare a trade war
against China on the day he takes office—if elected. Members of Congress
regularly take the floor to blame China for all the economic woes in America. None
of the American leaders of any stature have spoken about the importance of
getting along with China.
Bashing China has no apparent down side for American
politicians unless and until the bilateral relations between the two most
powerful nations spiral out of control leading to tragic consequences. The
challenge for the incoming leaders of Beijing is to strike a balance between
being more transparent to ameliorate American feelings and reassuring its own
constituents that China’s sovereignty is not being compromised by American
demands. It will be up to the American people to punish mindless China bashing
by voting the offenders out of the office and encourage leaders that recognize
the importance of promoting mutual trust between the two nations.
What’s at stake is the future peace and prosperity of
the world depending on China and the US getting along without rancor.
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A shorter version appeared in China-US Focus.